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The statutory procedures that Missouri courts follow in the disposition
of marital property on marriage dissolution are found in Missouri Revised
Statutes section 452.330.2 Enacted as part of the Missouri Dissolution of
Marriage Act 3 in 1973, section 452.330 broadly defines the term "marital
property" and lists several factors to be considered in arriving at a just divi-
sion of such property.4 Until recently, however, the extent to which a
spouse's pension rights could be treated as marital property within the
meaning of section 452.330 remained unclear. Following protracted appel-
late review, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded in Kuchta v. Kuchta5 that
trial courts may, unrestricted by fixed rules, treat pension rights as marital
property subject to equitable division on marriage dissolution.
Arlene and Eustis Kuchta had been married for more than nineteen
years when a decree of dissolution was entered in 1978.6 The Circuit Court
1. 636 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. En Banc 1982).
2. (Cum. Supp. 1982).
3. 1973 Mo. Laws 470 (codified at Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 452.300-.415 (1978)).
4. Patterned after Section 307 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, the
Missouri statute provides:
"/Maritalproperty" means all property acquired by either spouse sub-
sequent to the marriage except:
(1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to
the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise,
or descent;
(3) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(4) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(5) The increase in value of property acquired prior to the
marriage.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330.2 (Cum. Supp. 1982). See also UNIF. MARRIAGE & Di-
VORCE AcT § 307 (1970), 9A U.L.A. 142 (1979). Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330.1
(Cum. Supp. 1982) directs Missouri courts to consider "all relevant factors"
including:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital
property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(2) The value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the divi-
sion of property is to become effective. . .; and
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage.
5. 636 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Mo. En Banc 1982).
6. 1d. at 663.
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of Platte County divided the marital property of the parties. The decree of
dissolution set off to Eustis various assets, including the value of a TWA
retirement plan.7 At the date of dissolution, Eustis had been employed with
TWA for twenty-two years. Arlene, a homemaker, had not participated in
any retirement plan.
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District, finding that
the retirement plan was divisible as marital property, modified the decree of
dissolution to provide Arlene with a fractional share of retirement benefits
paid out of the plan.' Upon application of both parties, the cause was then
transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court. In a four-to-three decision af-
firming the decree and judgment of the circuit court, the supreme court
found that nonmatured pension rights did not constitute marital property
under Missouri law.' On rehearing, ° the supreme court again affirmed the
decree and judgment of the circuit court but conceded that Missouri courts
could properly consider prospective pension benefits as divisible marital
property. 1 1
On rehearing, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized the increasingly
important role of pension rights in the economic security of employees and
noted that an employee-spouse's pension rights may often be the most valu-
able asset of the marital community. 2 The court characterized pension
rights as a form of deferred compensation that frequently accrues during a
7. Id at 664.
8. Kuchta v. Kuchta, No. WD 30691, slip op. at 8 (Mo. App., W.D. July 8,
1980).
9. Kuchta v. Kuchta, No. 62439, slip op. at 6 (Mo. En Banc Sept. 8, 1981).
Relying on its decision in Robbins v. Robbins, 463 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1971), the
court determined that an employee-spouse could receive pension benefits within the
meaning of the marital property definition only "when the final contingency-that
he be alive to receive the payment-is fulfilled." Kuchla, supra, at 6. In Robbins,
which arose prior to the enactment of§ 452.330, the court had found that potential
pension benefits, in the absence of a right to the present value of such benefits, were
too speculative to warrant consideration in awarding alimony. 463 S.W.2d at 881.
10. The supreme court sustained appellant Arlene Kuchta's motion for rehear-
ing, withdrew its initial opinion, and heard further arguments. 636 S.W.2d at 663.
The motion for rehearing was supported by briefs of amici curiae Client Counsel of
Northeast Missouri, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Center on
Women and Family Law, and Women Lawyers' Association of Greater St. Louis.
11. 636 S.W.2d at 665. Although the circuit court awarded the entire interest
in the TWA retirement plan to Eustis Kuchta, the supreme court on rehearing de-
termined that the circuit court did properly consider the potential pension benefits
as marital property and further concluded that, in view of the relevant factors listed
in § 452.330 as applied to the instant case, the court could not "with any degree of
certainty declare that the result reached was not equitable and just." Id at 666-67.
See note 4 supra. The supreme court directed that its holding in Robbins no longer
be followed. 636 S.W.2d at 665. See note 9 supra.
12. 636 S.W.2d at 664.
[Vol. 48
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marriage and results from the joint efforts of both spouses." Similar char-
acterizations have led an expanding number of jurisdictions to recognize
the divisibility of pension rights as marital or community property.
1 4
13. Id at 665.
14. See Malone v. Malone, 587 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Alaska 1978) (per curiam);
Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 274, 569 P.2d 214, 216 (1977); In re Marriage
of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 842, 544 P.2d 561, 562-63, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634-35
(1976); Robert C.S. v. Barbara J.S., 434 A.2d 383, 387 (Del. 1981); Linson v. Lin-
son, 1 Hawaii App. 272,-, 618 P.2d 748, 750 (1980); Shill v. Shill, 100 Idaho 433,
-, 599 P.2d 1004, 1007 (1979); In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 658-59,
397 N.E.2d 511, 516 (1979); In re Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Iowa
1980); Foster v. Foster, 589 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Sims v. Sims, 358
So. 2d 919, 921 (La. 1978); Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392,-, 431 A.2d 1371, 1375
(1981); Miller v. Miller, 83 Mich. App. 672, 675, 269 N.W.2d 264, 265 (1978); Jen-
sen v. Jensen, 276 N.W.2d 68, 69 (Minn. 1979); In re Marriage of Miller, - Mont.
-, -, 609 P.2d 1185, 1187 (1980); Kullbom v. Kullbom, 209 Neb. 145, 150-51, 306
N.W.2d 844, 847-48 (1981); Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 475, 427 A.2d
76, 78 (1981); Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 412, 575 P.2d 99, 102 (1978);
Majauskas v. Majauskas, 110 Misc. 2d 323, -, 441 N.Y.S.2d 900, 901 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1981); Keig v. Keig, 270 N.W.2d 558, 560 (N.D. 1978); Hansen v. Hansen, 273
N.W.2d 749, 753 (S.D. 1979); Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1976);
In re Marriage of Jacobs, 20 Wash. App. 272, 273-74, 579 P.2d 1023, 1024-25
(1978); Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 129 n.3, 267 N.W.2d 235, 238 n.3
(1978). But see Paulsen v. Paulsen, 269 Ark. 523, 526, 601 S.W.2d 873, 875 (1980);
Ellis v. Ellis, 191 Colo. 317, 319, 552 P.2d 506, 507 (1976); Thompson v. Thompson,
42 C.L.J. 33, - (Conn. 1981); Sadler v. Sadler, - Ind. App. -, -, 428 N.E.2d
1305, 1308 (1981); Baker v. Baker, 120 N.H. 645, 648, 421 A.2d 998, 1000 (1980);
Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St. 2d 348, -, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1298 (1981); Baker v.
Baker, 546 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Okla. 1975); In re Marriage of Anderson, 27 Or. App.
193, 196, 555 P.2d 816, 817 (1976); Carter v. Carter, - S.C. -, -, 286 S.E.2d 139,
140 (1982); Bennet v. Bennet, 607 P.2d 839, 840 (Utah 1980). Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Montana, and New Jersey have, like Mis-
souri, adopted marital property provisions similar to UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE
ACT § 307 (1970), 9A U.L.A. 142 (1979). See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Cum.
Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (Cum. Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1513 (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (Smith-Hurd 1980); KY. REV.
STAT. § 403.190 (Cum. Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202 (1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A: 34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). See also note 4 supra. Ari-
zona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington are com-
munity property jurisdictions. In the leading case of In re Marriage of Brown, 15
Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976), the California Supreme Court
characterized pension rights as a contractual right to deferred compensation for
services rendered. Id at 845, 544 P.2d at 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637. As a contrac-
tual right, or chose in action, the California court concluded that pension rights
constitute a divisible contingent interest in property rather than a mere expectancy.
Id
Most of the courts that have prohibited the division of prospective pension
benefits have, nevertheless, required consideration of such pension rights in dividing
other marital assets or in awarding maintenance. See Paulsen v. Paulsen, 269 Ark.
1983]
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Prior to Kuchia, intermediate appellate courts in Missouri had gener-
ally recognized the divisibility of vested pension rights under section
452.330. " As the varied appellate opinions in Kuchta indicate, however, the
issue of pension rights as marital property was far from settled. 6 In its
resolution of the issue, the supreme court examined three periods of employ-
ment during which a marriage dissolution could occur: Stage I, Stage II,
and Stage III.7 The court described Stage I.as the period of employment
during which retirement benefits are "nonvested" and "nonmatured,"''
Stage II as the period during which benefits are "vested" but "nonma-
tured,"' 9 and Stage III as the period during which benefits are "vested" and
"matured. '2' The retirement benefits at issue in Kuchia fell within Stage
11.21 The supreme court, after briefly addressing the proper treatment of
523, 526, 601 S.W.2d 873, 875 (1980); In re Marriage of Ellis, 36 Colo. App. 234, -,
538 P.2d 1347, 1350 (1975); Thompson v. Thompson, 42 C.L.J. 33, - (Conn. 1981);
Sadler v. Sadler, - Ind. App. -, -, 428 N.E.2d 1305, 1308 (1981); Baker v. Baker,
120 N.H. 645, 648, 421 A.2d 998, 1001 (1980); Baker v. Baker, 546 P.2d 1325, 1326
(Okla. 1975); In re Marriage of Anderson, 27 Or. App. 193, 196, 555 P.2d 816, 817
(1976).
15. See Massey v. Massey, 594 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979); Mc-
Laughlin v. McLaughlin, 585 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979); Daffin v.
Daffin, 567 S.W.2d 672, 679 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978); Nilges v. Nilges, 564 S.W.2d
262, 263 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); Anspach v. Anspach, 557 S.W.2d 3, 6 (Mo. App.,
St. L. 1977); Ledbetter v. Ledbetter, 547 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977);
Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207, 212 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); In re Marriage of
Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949, 957 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975). See also Domestic Relations-
Husband's "Vested" Interest in Retirement Plan is Divisible as Marital Property, 42 Mo. L.
REV. 143 (1977). But see In re Marriage of Faulkner, 582 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1979) (retirement plan not marital property because plan provisions for
disposition of benefits "too speculative and not conducive to computation").
Although the term is often treated differently according to the context, pension
rights are deemed "vested" when a pension plan participant is entitled to receive
plan benefits irrespective of whether employment is terminated prior to retirement.
See D. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 130 (1975). See also notes
18-20 and accompanying text infra.
16. The Missouri Supreme Court had, prior to Kuchta, declined to review the
issue of pension rights as marital property. In re Marriage of Brethauer, 566 S.W.2d
462, 465 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
17. 636 S.W.2d at 665.
18. If employment is terminated during this period, the employee-spouse has
no right to receive any benefits, presently or in the future, except the amount of
employee contributions to the retirement plan plus interest. Id.
19. If employment is terminated during this period, the employee-spouse has a
right to receive certain benefits beyond the amount of employee contributions, but
only upon reaching a designated retirement age. Id
20. If employment is terminated during this period, the employee-spouse has a
present right to receive certain benefits beyond employee contributions. Id.
21. Kuchta v. Kuchta, No. WD 30691, slip op. at 5-6 (Mo. App., W.D. July 8,
1980). A report entitled "Your 1978 Personal Statement of Benefits," furnished by
[Vol. 48
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retirement benefits falling within Stages I and III,22 found that retirement
benefits falling within Stage II often present "speculative and perhaps insol-
uble questions" that require the application of a flexible approach to ac-
commodate the particular vesting and maturing provisions of the
retirement plan at issue." The court, emphasizing that the recognition of
pension rights as marital property does not require the actual division of
such rights in every case, authorized trial courts in Missouri to exercise
broad discretion in designing "some plan" when the division of pension
rights is necessary to protect the rights and interests of the parties to a mar-
riage dissolution.
24
The authority of trial courts to divide pension rights pursuant to state
marriage dissolution laws is limited by federal preemption with respect to
certain pensions created by federal law. In Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,25 the
United States Supreme Court determined that an anti-attachment provi-
sion of the Railroad Retirement Act of 197426 precludes the division of ben-
efits received under that Act.27 In McCary v. McCaro,28 the Supreme Court
found that federal law precluded a state court from dividing military
nondisability retirement pay pursuant to state marriage dissolution laws.
29
Although federal preemption remains a barrier to any division of pension
rights created by the Railroad Retirement Act, Congress recently re-
sponded to the McCarpy decision by enacting legislation that expressly per-
mits the division of disposable military retirement pay as marital or
community property, with specific conditions and limitations.3 0 To the ex-
TWA to Eustis Kuchta, was introduced at trial as Petitioner's Exhibit Number 3.
The report indicated the benefits payable under the retirement plan were 100%
vested.
22. In dicta, and without further elaboration, the court suggested: "Even a
casual reading of the somewhat artificially designed 'time-periods' makes it appar-
ent that a trial court, if it deemed proper in the first instance, could act with a
relative degree of certainty during Stage I or Stage III, with more lingering doubts
in the latter." 636 S.W.2d at 665.
23. 636 S.W.2d at 665.
24. Id at 665-66. Although refusing to set fixed rules with respect to the divi-
sion of pension rights, the Kuchta court did note the efforts of other courts, including
the method of division proposed by the intermediate appellate court in the instant
case. See note 61 and accompanying text infra.
25. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
26. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231t (1976).
27. 439 U.S. at 590. The anti-attachment provision is found in 45 U.S.C.
§ 231m (1976). In addition, id § 231d(c)(3) specifically cuts off a spouse's right to
receive a retirement annuity following a divorce from an employee covered by the
Act.
28. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
29. Id at 232.
30. See Department of Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1002,
96 Stat. 730 (1982) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408). Id § 1001 provides that
Title X of the Act may be cited as the "Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protec-
1983]
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tent of the specified conditions and limitations, federal preemption contin-
ues to restrict the application of state marriage dissolution laws to military
pensions. As noted by the Kuchia court on rehearing,"1 a 1978 amendment
to the federal civil service retirement laws expressly permits the division of
federal civil service retirement benefits upon marriage dissolution. 2 Unlike
the recent military pension legislation, the federal civil service retirement
laws as amended impose essentially no restriction on the divisibility of fed-
eral civil service retirement benefits pursuant" to state law.
Although most private pension plans are subject to federal regulation
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),a
the threat of federal preemption with respect to the division of pension
rights as marital or community property appears limited to those pension
rights that originate directly from federal pension legislation. Some state
courts have noted ERISA's restriction on the assignment and alienation of
plan benefits covered by the Act but have proceeded to determine the divis-
ibility of pension rights under their own marriage dissolution laws.a4 The
United States Supreme Court has dismissed appeals from two California
decisions holding that ERISA does not preclude the treatment of pension
rights as community property. 5 Thus, although the mandate of the Kuchla
court is limited by federal preemption with respect to certain pension rights
originating directly from federal retirement statutes, Missouri trial courts
may otherwise exercise unfettered discretion in the treatment of pension
rights as marital property, at least where such rights are vested but
tion Act." President Reagan signed the Defense Authorization Act into law on
September 8, 1982.
31. 636 S.W.2d at 665.
32. See 5 U.S.C. § 8345G) (Supp. V 1981), which provides in part that benefits
shall be paid (in whole or in part) by the Office to another person if and to
the extent expressly provided for in the terms of any court decree of di-
vorce, annulment, or legal separation, or the terms of any court order or
court-approved property settlement agreement incident to any court de-
cree of divorce, annulment, or legal separation.
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976). See generally Bonavich, Allocation of Private
Pension Benefits as Property in Illinois Divorce Proceedings, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 1 (1979).
34. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 665-66, 397 N.E.2d
511, 519 (1979); Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392, 401, 431 A.2d 1371, 1377 (1981).
ERISA's restriction on the assignment and alienation of retirement benefits is found
in 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).
35. See In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362
(1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980); Johns v. Retirement Fund Trust, 85
Cal. App. 3d 511, 149 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1978), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1028 (1980). Such dismissals of federal appeals are generally viewed as decisions on
the merits, indicating that no substantial federal question exists. Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975). See also Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.
1980) (concluding that federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with state courts
in suits by spouses seeking to enforce marital interests in ERISA-regulated pension
plans), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
[Vol. 48
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unmatured.3 6
The treatment of unmatured pension rights as marital or community
property has received considerable attention. Once it is determined that
pension rights are subject to division as marital or community property
under state law, attention necessarily focuses on the valuation of such inter-
ests and their allocation between the parties to a marriage dissolution. Val-
uation of the marital portion of pension rights necessarily involves a
determination of what pension interests have accrued during the marital
relationship. The accrual of pension interests is dependent on the nature
and provisions of the retirement plan in which the employee-spouse
participates.38
As noted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Kuchia, the nature and
provisions of pension plans vary considerably.39 Pension rights, or the right
to retirement benefits, may be provided to employees through numerous
vehicles, including traditional pension plans, profit sharing plans, money
purchase pension plans, employee stock ownership plans, Keogh plans, and
simplified employee pension plans.4 ° ERISA introduced two general cate-
gories for retirement plans: defined benefit plans and defined contribution
plans.4 In a defined benefit plan, accrued benefits are determined on the
basis of a benefit formula that expresses the accrued benefits in terms of the
benefits that a participant can expect to receive upon retirement. 42 The
accrued benefit in a defined benefit plan is generally dependent on years of
36. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
37. See generally Bonavich, supra note 33; DiFranza & Parkyn, Dividing Pensions
on Marital Dissolution, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 464 (1980); Fleck & Schiller, Developments in
MaritalProperty Law, 68 ILL. B.J. 698, 706-09 (1980); Foster & Freed, SpousalRights in
Retirement and Pension Benefits, 16 J. FAM. L. 187 (1977); Hardie, Pay Now or Later
Alternatives in the Disposition of Retirement Benefits on Divorce, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 106
(1978); Krauskopf, Marital Propert at Mamage Dissolution, 43 Mo. L. REv. 157
(1978); Krauskopf, A Theog for 'Just" Division of Marital Propery in Missouri, 41 Mo.
L. REV. 165 (1976); Leonard, Older Women andPensions: Catch 22, 10 GOLDEN GATE
L. REV. 1191, 1203-07 (1980); Pattiz, In a Divorce or Dissolution Who Gets the Pension
Rights.- Domestic Relations Law and Retirement Plans, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 191
(1978); Comment, Retirement Pay.- A Divorce in Time Saved Mine, 24 HASTINGS L.J.
347 (1973); Comment, Pensions as Proper Subject to Equitable Division upon Divorce in
Oklahoma, 14 TULSA L.J. 168 (1978); Pensions: After Mey v. Mey, When are Thy
Property Subject to Equitable Distribution upon Divorce in New jersey?, 12 RtJTGERS L.J.
261 (1980); Annot., 94 A.L.R.3d 176 (1979).
38. See Massey v. Massey, 594 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
39. 636 S.W.2d at 665.
40. See Brown, Pension and Profit Sharing Plans Distinguished, in INTRODUCTION
TO QUALIFIED PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLANS 11-66 (Practising Law Insti-
tute, Tax Law and Est. Planning Series 1982).
41. Id See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (34), (35) (1976).
42. See Brinster, Funding Plan Benefits, in INTRODUCTION TO QUALIFIED PEN-
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service, age, and compensation. 4' In a defined contribution plan, accrued
benefits are equal to the participant's individual account balance, which
may consist of both employer and employee contributions. 4 Defined con-
tribution plans pay participants the contributions accumulated in the par-
ticipant's individual account plus interest earned thereon and forfeitures
from other participants. 4 5 The nature of the retirement plan in which an
employee-spouse participates must be considered when attempting to value
the pension rights that have accrued during a marriage.
Valuation of pension rights is also dependent on the particular provi-
sions of the retirement plan at issue in a marriage dissolution. Provisions
relating to participation, contributions, vesting, distribution of benefits, cost
of living adjustments, plan earnings, and forfeitures are all relevant in valu-
ing prospective retirement benefits attributable to a marriage.46 Although
consideration of such plan provisions and other variables will not result in a
precise valuation of prospective retirement benefits, it will aid in approxi-
mating what interest is available for treatment as marital property in Mis-
souri. Precise valuation is not essential in equitable distribution
jurisdictions such as Missouri where, unlike community property states,
equal division of marital assets is not required.4 7 As a Washington court
noted in In re Marriage ofClark,4" "The key to an equitable distribution of
property is not mathematical preciseness, but fairness.",
49
Several methods of allocation are available for use by trial courts in the
equitable division and distribution of marital estates containing prospective
retirement benefits. In Kuchta, the court emphasized that the division of
pension rights between spouses is not mandatory, that the most desired re-
sult is a 'full andfinal division of marital property without contingencies." 50
Rather than divide prospective retirement benefits, a trial court may simply
consider pension rights as part of the marital estate and award to the non-
employee-spouse an offsetting amount of other marital property. Nondivi-
sion of pension rights has been advocated where the present value of the
pension rights is not too speculative and there is sufficient other marital
property to make an offsetting award.5" Where a lump sum award to the
nonemployee-spouse at the time of dissolution is appropriate, the trial court
43. Id
44. Id
45. See B. STONE, MOD. LEGAL FORMS § 6661.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
46. See Pattiz, supra note 37, at 220-27.
47. See Fleck & Schiller, supra note 37, at 707; Krauskopf, Marital Property at
larmage Dissolution, 43 Mo. L. REv. 157, 176 (1978).
48. 13 Wash. App. 805, 538 P.2d 145 (1975).
49. Id at 810.
50. 636 S.W.2d at 666.
51. See In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 663, 397 N.E.2d 511, 519
(1979); Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 477-78, 427 A.2d 76, 79 (1981);
Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 414, 575 P.2d 99, 104 (1978). In Kikkert, the
court noted that continued sharing of financial interests by divorced spouses is "too
[Vol. 48
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could first project the future growth of the pension rights that accrued dur-
ing the marriage, reduce the future value of the pension rights by the value
of taxes to be paid upon distribution of the benefits,52 and, finally, discount
the net amount to present value at the time of dissolution.53 A trial court
might also consider evidence of the cost of an annuity in establishing the
present value of future retirement benefits.5 4 In lieu of dividing prospective
retirement benefits, an equitable division of the marital estate could also
include a cash settlement payable in installments with interest.
55
In Kuchta, the court indicated that where the contingent nature of pen-
sion rights prohibits a full and final division of the marital estate, trial
courts are empowered to design "some plan" to protect the rights and inter-
ests of the parties, including the power to order a delayed percentage divi-
sion. 5 6 In an effort to apportion the risk of contingent pension rights,
numerous jurisdictions have sanctioned such a "wait-and-see" approach,
under which the trial court orders a division of the potential retirement
benefits if and when paid.57 Some courts have indicated that where such a
method of allocation is utilized, the employee-spouse retains the power to
determine, within the limits of the retirement plan, when and in what form
susceptible to continued strife and hostility." 177 N.J. Super. at 478, 427 A.2d at
79. See also Bonavich, supra note 37, at 46.
52. Corliss v. Corliss, - Wis. 2d -, -, 320 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Ct. App. 1982).
53. Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 133, 267 N.W.2d 235, 240 (1978). In
Jensen v. Jensen, 276 N.W.2d 68, 69 (Minn. 1979), the Minnesota Supreme Court
upheld a trial court's consideration of expert testimony relating to an accepted
formula for valuing an annuity pension by discounting for future interest and
mortality.
54. See Kis v. Kis, - Mont.-,-, 639 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1982). The court in
Kis also suggested that the employee-spouse might introduce evidence of the effect
any contingencies would have in diminishing the present value figure. Id at -, 639
P.2d at 1154.
55. See Hansen v. Hansen, 273 N.W.2d 749, 753 (S.D. 1979). See also DeRevere
v. DeRevere, 5 Wash. App. 741, 746, 491 P.2d 249, 253 (1971). In Malone v. Ma-
lone, 587 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Alaska 1978), the court awarded to the nonemployee-
spouse, as a share of retirement benefits, a monthly sum payable during the lives of
the parties.
56. 636 S.W.2d at 666.
57. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 848, 544 P.2d 561, 567, 126
Cal. Rptr. 63 , 639 (1976); Robert C.S. v. Barbara J.S., 434 A.2d 383, 387 (Del.
1981); Shill v. Shill, 100 Idaho 433, -, 599 P.2d 1004, 1010 (1979); In re Marriage
of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 662-63, 397 N.E.2d 511, 519 (1979); Foster v. Foster,
589 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919, 921 (La.
1978); Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392,-, 431 A.2d 1371, 1377-81 (1981); Kikkert
v. Kikkert, 177 NJ. Super. 471, 477-78, 427 A.2d 76, 79-80 (1981); Copeland v.
Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 414, 575 P.2d 99, 104 (1978); Cearley v. Cearley, 544
S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1976); DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wash. App. 741, 746, 491
P.2d 249, 253 (1971).
1983]
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payments will be made from the plan.58 Pension plan participants often
have the power to elect between an annuity and a lump sum distribution
5 9
and may have the option to alter benefits by electing an early or late
retirement.
The division of pension rights if and when paid avoids the difficulty of
determining the present value of prospective retirement benefits60 but does
require the trial court to determine an appropriate formula for setting the
percentage. In Kuchia, the intermediate appellate court concluded that the
trial court must retain jurisdiction to fix the percentage when payments
under the retirement plan commence and to modify the percentage at any
time thereafter, as necessary.6 ' The supreme court, however, indicated that
the percentage should be resolved and fixed at the time of dissolution.
62
The most practical approach would appear to require only that a formula
for determining the percentage be settled at the time of dissolution, with the
58. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 849, 544 P.2d 561, 568, 126
Cal. Rptr. 633, 640 (1976); Farver v. Department of Retirement Systems, 97 Wash.
2d 344, -, 644 P.2d 1149, 1151 (1982). In Farver, the court also found that the
percentage interest awarded to the nonemployee-spouse was inheritable. 97 Wash.
2d at -, 644 P.2d at 1153. In Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364, -, 534 P.2d
1355, 1359 (1975), the trial court had excused the husband from the duty to make
payments from his retirement benefits to his former spouse if, through no fault of his
own, the benefits failed to mature. The court did, however, require the husband to
pay a certain amount per month from his salary if he chose not to retire when
eligible. 85 Wash. 2d at -, 534 P.2d at 1359.
59. I. GOODMAN, RETIREMENT DISTRIBUTIONS I (CCH Pension Plan Guide
No. 390, Sept. 17, 1982).
60. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1976). In Kuchta, counsel for
Arlene Kuchta noted that expert evidence on valuation may not be available to
parties of modest means. Appellant's Brief on Rehearing at 7.
61. Kuchta v. Kuchta, No. WD 30691, slip op. at 9 (Mo. App., W.D. July 8,
1980). Pointing to several contingencies in the ultimate payout of benefits under
the retirement plan, the court concluded that it would be improper to require Eus-
tis Kuchta to pay to Arlene her share of the pension rights in cash or even as a
"fixed and definite liability, for the retirement benefits bird is yet in the bush." Id
at 7. The court also noted that the equation for fixing the percentage division could
be expressed as: the number of years of the marriage as the numerator, with the
number of years of employment as the denominator (this fraction representing the
rights that accrued during the marriage), multiplied by a fraction representing the
share of the nonemployee-spouse (the court suggested a fraction of 1/2). However,
the court concluded that the use of such a simple years-in-marriage to years-out-of-
marriage ratio would be improper where later year contributions to the retirement
plan, outside of the marriage, might account for a larger portion of the pension
benefits. Id at 8-9.
62. 636 S.W.2d at 666. The court suggested that the respective shares should
not be contingent on future events "requiring further resort to the courts." Id
[Vol. 48
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numbers being inserted when the employee-spouse retires.6" To effectuate
the delayed percentage division, the decree of dissolution might also order
that payments to the nonemployee-spouse be made directly from the ad-
ministrator or trustee of the retirement plan.
6 4
While trial courts in Missouri may, following Kuchta, exercise broad
discretion in the treatment of vested but nonmatured pension rights as mar-
ital property, the extent to which Missouri courts might treat nonvested
rights as marital property remains unclear.6 5 The courts of numerous other
jurisdictions have concluded that nonvested as well as vested pension rights
are subject to division as marital or community property.6 6 The Kuchta
court's conclusion that "the threatened presence of contingencies which
may create differing degrees of 'risk of forfeiture'" does not alter the treat-
ment of pension rights created by the joint efforts of both spouses67 would
support the treatment of nonvested rights as marital property. Contribu-
tions to a retirement plan, even though nonvested, may be made by an
employer on behalf of an employee-spouse during the course of the latter's
marriage. In addition, years of service with the employer prior to the vest-
ing of employer contributions count toward the period of employment re-
quired for vested status. Although the nonvested status of pension rights
should be a relevant consideration in the valuation and method of alloca-
tion of such rights,68 nonvested status by itself should not preclude any and
63. See DiFranza & Parkyn, supra note 37, at 467. See also Sims v. Sims, 358 So.
2d 919, 921 (La. 1978).
64. See 1 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCIi) 2533, at 4293 (1979). In Kuchta, the
intermediate appellate court suggested that the decree of dissolution should order
the employee-spouse to make no alienation of the pension rights, including the elec-
tion of a joint and survivor annuity with a subsequent spouse, without providing for
the protection of the former spouse's rights. Kuchta v. Kuchta, No. WD 30691, slip
op. at 9 (Mo. App., W.D. July 8, 1980). It has also been suggested that counsel for
the nonemployee-spouse should join the pension plan as a party to the dissolution
proceeding. See DiFranza & Parkyn, supra note 37, at 467.
65. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
66. See Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 274, 569 P.2d 214, 216 (1977);In
re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 842, 544 P.2d 561, 562-63, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633, 634-35 (1976); Robert C.S. v. Barbara J.S., 434 A.2d 383, 387 (Del. 1981);
Linson v. Linson, 1 Hawaii App. 272, -, 618 P.2d 748, 750 (1980); Shill v. Shill,
100 Idaho 433, -, 599 P.2d 1004, 1007 (1979); In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App.
3d 653, 658-59, 397 N.E.2d 511,516 (1979); Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392,-, 431
A.2d 1371, 1375 (1981); Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 475, 427 A.2d 76,
78 (1981); Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1976); Bloomer v.
Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 129 n.3, 267 N.W.2d 235, 238 n.3 (1978).
67. 636 S.W.2d at 665.
68. The Kuchta court's intimations as to the certainty with which a trial court
could dispose of nonvested rights could be read as referring merely to valuation and
allocation, but such a reading would be inconsistent with the court's reference to
the speculative and insoluble questions arising with respect to vested pension rights.
See notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text supra.
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all treatment of nonvested pension rights as marital property.69 Any risk
that contributions will fail to vest could be equitably allocated between the
spouses by the utilization of a delayed percentage division.70
The express recognition that vested pension rights, at least, may be
treated as marital property in Missouri undoubtedly furthers the policies
and goals of the Missouri Dissolution of Marriage Act.7 1 During marriage,
the accrual of pension rights attributable to the employment of either
spouse creates mutual expectations of retirement security. Even where both
spouses are employed and each participates in a retirement plan, the unlike-
lihood that the respective pension rights will be of equal value necessitates
the treatment of such rights as marital property when equitably dividing
and distributing the marital estate. The Kuchta court's grant of authority to
employ a flexible approach in the treatment of vested but unmatured pen-
sion rights as marital property should enable Missouri trial courts to more
adequately safeguard spousal rights and expectations arising from the mari-
tal endeavor.
JAMES M. SELLE
69. On rehearing, the Kuchta court began its analysis of the pension rights issue
with the following observation:
On reflection, it becomes apparent that whether or not present or pro-
spective pension rights are to be classified as marital property is no longer
of primary concern, but rather the manner by which the trial court can
treat the same in seeking to reach a fair and equitable division thereof if
necessary to comply with § 452.330.
636 S.W.2d at 664.
70. See In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d at -, 397 N.E.2d at 519.
71. In Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977), the court
observed:
As opposed to the old order, the Dissolution of Marriage Act views the
acquisition of "marital property" as a partnership endeavor, and it enun-
ciates a standard for dividing such property which is flexible enough to
weigh and balance the respective contributions of the spouses and to ac-
commodate consideration of manifest justness and fairness.
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